Abstract. While it is troubling when power index values change with the index, the problem is more severe; different indices can generate radically different rankings; e.g., a 15-player game exists with over a trillion different strict index rankings of the players. In contrast, for each number of players certain indices always share the same ranking; e.g., the Shapley and Banzhaf rankings agree with three players, but they can even have opposite rankings with more players. It is shown how index outcomes can be sensitive to assumptions and when players leave a game.
Introduction
How does a voter's impact in the selection of the US President through the Electoral College differ from state to state, or among multi-representative districts, or in different EC voting blocs, or in corporate weighted voting schemes where the weights are determined by the number of shares a voter owns? How does one measure the contributions of a player, say Michael Jordan, to professional basketball, or the value added by different units in designing a company's new product, or the division of the costs for a public project? Power indices and semivalues, which measure each player's contributions to a game, provide ways to address these questions.
The value of these game theory tools is reflected by how they have influenced US Supreme Court decisions ([30] ) where academics (e.g., Grofman [11] ) have justified seemingly ludicrous assertions. They are used to understand interactions in the Economic Community (Berg [3] , Brams [5] , Nurmi and Meskanen [19] ), the UN Security Council (Shapley and Shubik [27] , Brams [4] ), and the Canadian scheme for amending their Constitution (Miller [18] , Straffin [28] , Kilgour [16] ). Other uses include analyzing the relative power of parties in a multiparty legislature, voting blocs in Congress, effects of voting groups in GATT, WTO, UN, NATO, etc. (For references, see Shapley [26] .) An early, intuitive use is the "small state -large state" controversy in the design of the US Constitution; the compromise leading to two houses of Congress directly reflects the struggle to achieve parity in power. For other pragmatic and theoretical uses, see Brams [4, 5] , Grofman [11] , Ordeshook [20] , Shapley [25, 26] , and Straffin [29] .
1.1. Index rankings. It can be troubling when different indices assign different values to the players in a game (this phenomenon is generic, so it must be expected); it is even more bothersome when the differences force the index rankings to differ significantly. To suggest why ranking differences are of interest consider the accepted assessment that Michael Jordan is the "best professional basketball player of all times." Presumably, this means that an index ranks Jordan at the top. But, could this outcome more accurately reflect the choice of the index rather than Jordan's worth? Namely, with the same information, might another index rank Jordan much lower? How does the index choice affect the rankings?
Ranking differences raise questions about the meaning of the indices. This becomes particularly apparent in politics where indices are used to determine the relative strengths of players -be they groups, states, or countries -in a forum. While we may expect the selected index to accurately portray the relative strengths of groups, if varying the indices can generate radically different Saari's research was supported by NSF grant DMI-9971794 and his Arthur and Gladys Pancoe Professorship. Sieberg thanks the NU Dept. of Political Science where she was a Visiting Asst. Prof. when we started this work. Our particular thanks to a referee who made some useful suggestions.
rankings, then we must wonder whether any (or which) index provides an adequate measure. Moreover, if the rankings or the top-ranked player can change with the index, then the index choice has the potential of becoming a manipulative tool. Obvious incentives to be strategic include when an award goes to the top-player, or political power is assigned according to index values. Similarly, if a carefully selected index can persuade a group with few votes that it has more strength, then these indices may deter the group from clamoring for a greater political participation. This reality is manifested by court arguments (e.g., US Supreme Court [30] ) over the use and choice of indices. Incidentally, we show how to strategically select indices.
To support our assertion that an outcome can reflect which index is used rather than the players' actual contributions, our major results (Thms. 2, 3) prove that it is surprisingly easy to construct a game with millions of different rankings where each candidate is top-ranked with some indices and bottom ranked with others. The game remains fixed so, clearly, not all of these conflicting rankings accurately capture the players' contributions. Moreover, this conclusion is robust; it holds even after slight changes in the game. (More precisely, there is an open set of games with this property.) Our geometric approach also identifies when to expect the rankings associated with a game to enjoy agreement, and when they must radically differ; it even displays the point spreads among indices. Reflecting one of our interests (KKS) in political science, this ranking behavior is described for a class of voting games.
Since rankings can radically vary with the index, we should wonder whether the outcomes are susceptible to other parameters. This concern goes to the heart of Justice Harlan's dissenting argument [30] in a U.S. Supreme Court case about the sensitivity of the Banzhaf index to assumptions about the game. While Grofman [11] nicely vindicates Harlan's claims (using the central limit theorem), we know of no general analysis indicating the fate of other indices. We contribute to this discussion by showing, for instance, which indices are most sensitive to changes in a game and why the Shapley value is the most resilient.
Another interesting example illustrating how changes in the properties of a game can create a drastic change in the power structure comes from 1998 German elections. Before the vote, the expectation was that the Social Democrats would form a Grand Coalition with the ruling Christian Democrats. As the Social Democrats did better than predicted, an alliance with the Green party, to form the "Red-Green Alliance," now became feasible. Thus, differences in the game structure created the dramatic promotion to power of the Green party which previously had only a minor role due to its traditional share of about 5% of the vote.
Countering our "chaotic" results displaying large numbers of diverse rankings is another result (Thm. 4) establishing a surprising order. We show that certain indices always share the same ranking no matter what the game. Unexpectedly, this agreement depends upon the number of players; e.g., while the rankings for the Banzhaf and Shapley values must agree for three players, they can even reverse one another for four player games.
Finally, we briefly examine how rankings can change as players leave the game. For instance, how does the relative importance of a player, or political party, depends upon the availability of other agents? Using a basketball example, had Scottie Pippen (another well known basketball player) quit basketball, would Jordan's relative worth have dropped or increased? In politics, one can imagine how the interests of parties can change with certain unions. While changes must be expected, we also should anticipate some consistency. After all, what does an index mean if the top-ranked player always is bottom ranked when any other player drops out? We indicate how this ranking consistency depends on the nature of the game and the choice of an index.
1.2.
Comparison. This feature where different indices support different conclusions has motivated much of the literature describing the strengths and weaknesses of the the Shapley value [24] , the Shapley-Shubik value [27] , the Banzhaf index [1, 2] , the Deegan-Packel index [7] , the Holler-Packel index [12] , and so forth. To provide guidance in the selection of indices, axiomatic representations have been developed (e.g., see the above as well as Straffin [29] and Owen [21] ).
As axiomatics strive to identify what to expect from each procedure, they emphasize particular indices. In contrast, our geometric approach permits the outcomes and certain properties of all indices to be simultaneously compared. With this approach, we can explore how the outcomes from indices differ, understand why this is the case, and identify new properties.
Recent results
In a May 1999 conference at the Université de Caen, V. Merlin introduced his results with A. Laruelle [14] about one of these themes. By combining results from [6, 22] , they showed that a game exists with different rankings as the index varies. The first paper (Calvo et al. [6] ) relates each index of a n-player game with a n-candidate positional voting method. (Such a method is defined by a voting vector w n = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ), w 1 > w n , w j ≥ w j+1 , ∀j = 1, . . . , n − 1, where w j points are assigned to a voter's jth ranked candidate, j = 1, . . . , n.) As the Calvo et al. argument transforms voters' preferences over n-candidates into characteristic functions for a particular n-player game, it imports positional voting results into game theory. (Similarly, D. Haunsperger [15] obtained unexpected conclusions for nonparametric statistics by transferring parallel results from positional voting.) Laruelle and Merlin transferred a result from Saari [22, 23] proving that a ten-candidate profile exists where millions of different election rankings arise by varying the positional voting method. Thus a 10 player game exists with millions of different index rankings. The game remains fixed; the millions of rankings reflect the different choices of an index.
As Merlin noted, their results are seriously limited because the Calvo et al. transformation creates games with restricted, maybe undesired properties. For instance, if ν is the characteristic value of a game, then we might require von Neumann's [31] superadditive property whereby [17] or Ordeshook [20] ), the value a game assigns to coalition S is given by the characteristic value ν(S). If i ∈ S, then it is arguable that i's contribution in joining S is captured by the difference [ν(
While the term "power index" is used in several ways in the literature, we adhere to (but slightly modify the notation) the more precise terminology developed in the 1980s. Here, for the class of N -player TU games, ψ is a semivalue (Dubey, Neyman, and Weber [9] and Einy [10] ) if there exists a collection of nonnegative numbers {λ k } n k=1 such that
and for each i ∈ N,
Our notation slightly differs from tradition (by counting the number of players in S ∪ i rather than S) to simplify describing results. As semivalues emphasize the size of a coalition, rather than who is in a coalition, they include the Shapley value [24] where λ i = 1/n n−1 i−1 , and the Banzhaf index [2] where λ i = 1/2 n−1 . The sports example requires λ i = 0 whenever |S| = i represents a team with more members than permitted by regulations.
Requiring λ k to depend on the size of a coalition is useful for many issues' e.g., racial or gender equity. In other settings, such as sports, the members of a coalition are important. (For instance, a soccer team consisting only of goalies is not improved by adding still another goal tender.) Or, consider the relative power of the justices on the US Supreme Court where Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas form a conservative coalition, while Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens are viewed as defining a more liberal coalition. Remaining are Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. On a divided conservative-liberal issue, it is unlikely that the conservative and liberal blocs will create a majority opinion. Thus, a more accurate measure of the two main coalitions, and of Kennedy and of O'Connor, is to use multipliers defined in terms of the membership of coalitions. This motivates the more general probabilistic values introduced by Weber [32] .
An operator ψ is a probabilistic value if for each i ∈ N there is a collection of nonnegative numbers {λ i S } S⊂N \i where S⊂N \i λ i S = 1 and
Each semivalue is a probabilitistic value; there are probabilistic values which are not semivalues.
The geometry causing trillions of rankings
As we show, the number of semivalue rankings grows rapidly with the number of players. For instance, there are 14-player games with over 80 billion (precisely, 80,951,270,400) different strict semivalue rankings. (By counting rankings with ties, the number escalates into the trillions.) Then, there are 15-player games with over a trillion different strict rankings. These assertions hold for a wide selection of games; e.g., they do not depend on whether the game is monotonic, or super or subadditive, etc.
To develop intuition and notation, describe Eq. 2.3 in the matrix representation 
and vector form
where the terms have the obvious definitions from Eq. 2.3 and M n (ν) is a n × n matrix with entries depending upon the game. If P j designates the jth column of M n , its kth entry is the sum of the kth player's contributions by joining coalitions of size (j − 1). To emphasize that a semivalue is the weighted contributions of each player to coalitions of all sizes, rewrite Eq. 3.1 as . But asP j is strictly determined by the ν values assigned to coalitions of size j and (j − 1), games can be constructed where eachP j has a different ranking; e.g., we can construct a game where j is top-ranked withP j , j = 1, . . . , n. While this construction has the innocuous interpretation that each player has the strongest influence with coalitions of a certain size, it also ensures that with this game each player is top-ranked with an appropriately chosen semivalue. (For j to be top-ranked, choose aλ which emphasizesλ j .)
To illustrate with a three player game, the n = 3 version of Matrix 3.1 is 
where A i is the sum of values assigned to i-player coalitions and, for convenience, ν({1, 2, 3}) = 1. Player i is top-ranked with P i if and only if the ith component of P i is the largest. Thus, select ν so that • ν({1}) has the largest value for the one-player coalitions,
] is the largest value in column two, and • ν({1, 2}) is the smallest value for two-player coalitions.
As two of these conditions involve rankings and the last one involves differences, constructing examples is easy. For instance, a superadditive game satisfying these conditions is
The averaged vertices arê
.425, 0.375),P 3 = P 3 with the respective semivalue rankings of 1 2 3, 2 3 1, 3 2 1.
The barycentric Shapley value for this game is 1 3 P j = (0.2667, 0.3917, 0.375) where its 2 3 1 ranking agrees with that ofP 2 . (As shown in Cor. 1, this is no accident.) The Banzhaf index of (0.3667, 0.5333, 0.4666) has the same ranking (again, according to Cor. 1, this is no accident), butP 2 's stronger influence on the Banzhaf outcome is manifested by the added significance given to player two's top standing.
With all the freedom available to design this example, it is clear that games can be constructed to satisfy other specified conditions such as, say, subadditivity, etc.
3.2. Generic and sensitive. This geometry is central for all of our results, so we illustrate its use before stating our main results. First, we support our assertion that, usually, different indices define different values.
Theorem 1. For almost all choices of the characteristic values for a game, the values defined by two different indices differ. Indeed, only for those special games where allP j values agree must all indices agree.
As the vertices change with changes in the ν values, generically the vertices disagree. The conclusion follows because differentλ choices define different positions within the hull -hence, different index values. All indices agree only if allP j agree; e.g., this degenerate situation occurs if ν(S) = j∈S ν(j).
The geometry also identifies which indices are more susceptible to changes in the characteristic values of a game. The geometry is clear; if changes in assumptions alter a particular vertex, the indices near that vertex are more profoundly affected. (So for n = 3, if only one vertex of the triangular semivalue hull moves, then points closer to this vertex are stronger affected.) Conversely, hull point further away from any affected vertices are more minimally affected. This geometry dictates that, if changes in each vertex are equally likely, then the point most resilient to changes must be the barycentric point -the Shapley value. Thus, if changes are made in a uniform manner to each vertex, the expected change of the Shapley value is the smallest.
To relate this geometry to Justice Harlan's comments (see Grofman [11] ), Harlan claims that a slight change in assumptions about voter preferences could change a voter's Banzhaf power by an astronomical 12 × 10 19 multiple. Such multiples require the original Banzhaf values to be so minuscule that even a small change is a large multiple. This happens with Harlan's example of 300,000 voters in a two party election where each voter is equally likely to vote for either party. But when it is equally likely for a voter to vote either way, it is highly unlikely for a voter joining a coalition of even 200,000 to determine the election outcome by supplying a particular candidate the decisive 150,001st vote. Thus allP j vertices, j < 200, 000 have nearly zero components. As this assumption makes it highly unlikely for a medium sized coalition to have enough voters for victory, the vertices representing medium sized coalitions are nearly zero; in turn, this explains why each voter's minuscule Banzhaf value, derived from the semivalue hull with 300,000 vertices, is around 300,000 150,000 /2 300,000 . But changing the assumption so that, say, with probability p = 0.55 a voter votes for party A, then it is more likely for a voter to cast the deciding vote when joining a coalition of, say, size 200,000. Thus, this likelihood assumption changes theP j vertices for midsized coalitions; changes that even if small in value reflect astronomical scale changes for indices, such as the Banzhaf value, which are strongly affected by the middle level vertices. Indices more to the center of the hull, such as the Shapley value, are not as drastically changed.
3.3. Geometry. The approach used to construct the above three-player example only ensures, for instance, that there is a 14-player game with 14 different semivalue rankings; this statement comes nowhere near satisfying our assertion about a 14-player game with billions of different strict semivalue rankings. Yet, our more surprising conclusion involves nothing more than appropriately selecting theP j vertices. But first we need to describe the geometry of the semivalue hull.
Assign each R n axis to a particular player. Because the indifference plane x i = x j divides R n into two sectors, if p is in the sector where p i > p j , then player i is ranked above player j. The n 2 indifference planes defined by all pairs partition R n into ranking regions; the n! open cones correspond to the n! strict rankings of the players. Regions on an indifference plane involve tied outcomes. The completely tied line defined by the intersection of all indifference planes is where all players are ranked equal.
To represent the ranking regions, use the positive orthant R n
(As all coordinates of a R n + vector are non-negative, all monotonic games are in this orthant.) Fig. 1 for n = 3) intersects each ranking region. The six small triangular regions of Fig. 1a correspond to strict rankings; a region's ranking is determined by the distance of a point to each vertex where "closer is better." For instance, because the • is in the region closest to vertex 3, next closest to vertex 1, and farthest from vertex 2, the associated ranking is 3 
Fig. 1. Representation triangles
To visualize all semivalue rankings in a game, project the hull to Si(n). To do so, divide eacĥ P j by the sum of its components to defineP * j ∈ Si(n). (IfP j is the zero vector, let its projection be the complete indifference point 1 n (1, . . . , 1).) This defines the normalized semivalue where the sum of values assigned to the players equals unity. Although the convex hull defined by {P * j } n j=1 , the normalized semivalue hull, is not the semivalue hull, the ordinal rankings admitted by aλ is the same in both hulls.
To illustrate with the earlier three-player game, the pointŝ
are plotted in Fig. 1b whereP * 1 is in the lower left region,P * 2 is in the middle, andP * 3 is the point in the upper right region. We constructed this game to have at least three different strict rankings of the players, but the normalized semivalue hull (defined by {P * j } 3 j=1 ) intersects four strict ranking regions and three regions which involve one tie. Thus, the geometric positioning of the hull proves that instead of three strict rankings, this particular game admits seven different semivalue rankings; four are strict (the new one is 2 1 3) and three rankings have ties (1 ∼ 2 3, 2 1 ∼ 3, and 2 ∼ 3 1).
The geometry also tells us that for this particular game, semivalues with a stronger emphasis on individual players have a 1 2 3 ranking, indices which emphasize the coalition of all players have the reversed ranking, those with an emphasis on midsized coalitions have the 2 3 1 ranking, and those with more balance between the small and midsized coalitions have the 2 1 3 outcome. (To find which indices have which rankings, use elementary algebra with the semivalue hull.) Again, the freedom available in the designing this game shows that it is highly likely for games to have multiple ranking outcomes.
Earlier we suggested that these differences in index rankings makes the choice of an index a strategic variable. The geometry shows that such opportunities are available when there are different outcomes, and how to identify strategic choices; e.g., the argument just used to identify which indices rank each player top-ranked also identifies strategic choices for supporters of different outcomes.
Main results.
One of our main results describes the radical variation allowed in the rankings. To motivate the technical sounding second assertion, suppose there is a game with the completely tied point in the interior of the normalized semivalue hull. As this completely tied point is on the boundary of all ranking regions, the geometry would require all possible rankings to occur; e.g., each of the n! strict rankings would occur with some semivalue. Fortunately, as asserted, such wild outcomes cannot occur.
Theorem 2. For any n ≥ 2, there exists an open set of choices of games where the semivalue ranking of the players depends upon the selected semivalue. Indeed, for each integer
Although not all rankings can occur, the admitted rankings can be so general that not much relief is provided. This is because Thm. 2 ensures there are n-player games with n! − (n − 1)! different semivalue strict rankings. (An n = 3 example with the maximum 3! − 2! = 4 strict rankings is given above.) To design such a game, select ν values so that theP * j vertices are sufficient spread among different ranking regions; while this construction designs a game where different players have success with coalitions of different sizes, it also requires the normalized semivalue hull to meet the largest possible number of ranking regions. In other words, the geometry defined by the {P j } vertices completely determines whether a game admits many, or only a few different semivalue rankings. This geometry also determines the differences in points assigned by different indices.
While no game has all possible rankings, the semivalues can include up to (1 − 1 n ) of all strict rankings. Thus, as n increases in value, the fraction of all rankings which can be semivalue rankings quickly approaches unity. The following table indicates how rapidly the number of admitted semivalue rankings grows into the billions and trillions. By using the more general probabilitistic values, all possible rankings can occur.
Theorem 3. Assume that for each player, there is at least one coalition where the player adds positive value to the coalition by joining it. For any such game, the set of probabilistic values include all possible (transitive, complete) rankings of the n alternatives.
Proof. For each coalition S and player j ∈ S, let V j,S ∈ R n be where the jth component is ν(S) − ν(S\j) and all other components are zero. The set of probabilistic values includes the convex hull of {V j,S }. As by assumption each R n positive axis contains at least one of these vectors, the convex hull meets all possible ranking regions.
3.5. Some structure. To introduce the tools need for our next major result, we show how to construct a n = 3 game so that two selected semivalues, withλ 2 = 0, have selected rankings. As the outcome forλ = (λ 1 , 0,λ 3 ) is p =λ 1P1 + (1 −λ 1 )P 3 , p is at a specified position on the line defined by the endpointsP 1 ,P 3 . Since the locations of the endpointsP 1 ,P 3 are determined by the characteristic values of, respectively, single player and the difference between three and two player coalitions, it is easy to construct a game to place this line in any desired position. So, position the line (i.e., construct a game) to place the two indicated points (semivalues) in the appropriate designated ranking region. Placing the line close to the completely tied center point (where all regions meet), allows the rankings of the indicated semivalues to even reverse one another. (Such a situation is in Figs. 1 ) is the reversed 3 2 1. As Prop. 1 ensures freedom in choosing rankings for any two indices satisfyingλ 2 = 0, we must anticipate wilder examples by removing this restriction. Instead, structure emerges. To suggest why, notice by specifying any two columns of Matrix 3.4, the third column is uniquely determined. Consequently, choosing P 1 and P 3 determines P 2 . We must wonder whether this dependency forces a class of semivalues to always share the same ranking. This is the case.
To explain with n = 3, the semivalue ranking is the ranking of the coordinates of p =λ 1P1 + λ 2P2 +λ 3P3 . Terms which appear in all coordinates of a column, such as (A 2 − A 1 ), do not affect the ranking, so the semivalue ranking is that of the coordinates of  
Theorem 4. For n ≥ 3, the simplex of power indices, The last conclusion, stating that rankings for different equiranking lines can differ as wildly as desired, can be extended to assert that after (n − 1) different rankings and (n − 1) semivalues (from different equiranking classes) are selected, there is a game where the jth semivalue has the jth ranking; j = 1, . . . , n − 1. However, this result requires an extra condition (essentially, theλ j must be linearly independent; see the comments following the proof in Sect. 6).
The equiranking lines for n = 3 are represented in Fig. 2 . This figure (and this observation extends to all n ≥ 3) proves that the common ranking shared by all semivalues in an equiranking class is determined by the ranking of a semivalue in the class with someλ j = 0. This observation simplifies the design of games where two specified semivalues,λ j , j = 1, 2, have specified rankings r j . To illustrate with n = 3, rather than using the actualλ j , replace each with a semivalue from its equiranking class whereλ 2 = 0. Then, as described earlier, adjustP 1 andP 3 positions so that the position equivalent toλ j has ranking r j . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Fig. 2. Equiranking classes of power indices
An interesting consequence of Thm. 4 is that the Shapley and Banzhaf indices are in the same n = 3 equiranking class. This m = 1 equiranking class, defined byλ 1 =λ 3 , is the line connecting the midpoint of theλ 1 -λ 3 edge with theλ 2 vertex. In turn, this requires the common ranking for these two indices to be completely determined by the ranking of mid-sized coalitions as given byP 2 ; the contributions from coalitions of other sizes (given byP 1 andP 3 ) influence the values but not the ranking. According to Eq. 3.8, these indices are not in the same class for n ≥ 4. 3.6. Voting models. Not all games allow billions of conflicting semivalue rankings, so an interesting project is to characterize those games which permit some regularity. The way to do this is to determine how the game structure affects the positioning of theP j vertices. When the structure forces the {P j } n j=1 vertices to be reasonably similar, the semivalue rankings are closely related; when the ranking of the vertices differ (i.e., when different players make a stronger contribution over different sized coalitions), anticipate results of the kind described in Thm. 2. To illustrate with one regularity, we describe a natural class of games for political science.
Corollary 1. For all three player games, the Shapley and Banzhaf rankings always agree. This common ranking is that ofP
A typical model measuring power in a legislative body captures when a coalition or party is decisive in certain votes. For a majority vote, for instance, one might assign ν(S) = 1 if |S| > n/2, and ν(S) = 0 if |S| ≤ n/2. To go beyond these so-called "simple games" to capture, say, when a coalition can pass legislation with a majority vote and when it can overcome a presidential veto with a two-thirds vote, we might use 2 ).) By using the ν of Eq. 3.9 to include the ability to override vetos, we have thatP 1 = 0,P 2 = (1.5, 1.25, 1.25), P 3 = (0.5, 0, 0) where all but one semivalue has the 1 2 ∼ 3 ranking. The exception iŝ λ = (1, 0, 0) with its 1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3 ranking.
The proof of Thm. 5 uses the observation that the ranking for eachP j comes from S 1 S 2 · · · S k . Since all semivalues are convex combinations of these vertices, the conclusion follows. To show that the vertex rankings have this property, we show that if |S s | > |S t |, thenP j ranks S s S t . To do so, consider coalitions of (j − 1) parties which do not include S s or S t . The generalized voting game requires S s to provide a larger (or equal) change in the characteristic value when it joins these j − 1 parties than would S t . Similarly, in a coalition of j parties which includes both S s and S t , removing S s rather than S t causes a larger (or equal) change in the characteristic value of the remaining coalition. Thus, S s S t with P j (and, hence, withP j ). This completes the proof.
Dropping players
Is a semivalue ranking retained after a player is dropped? If the new game differs significantly, then no relationship should be expected. Thus, answers depend upon how the two games are related. The following natural setting preserves much of the game structure. Even with standard subgames, the behavior caused by players leaving can be discouraging. This discouraging result allows, for instance, the semivalue ranking for all n players to be 1 2 · · · n, when last place player n drops out, the new ranking reverses to n − 1 n − 2 · · · 1, when player n − 1 drops out, the ranking is, say, 1 n − 2 2 . . . . In other words, no regularity in rankings can be assumed when players leave. Any semivalue (with the one minor assumption) is allowed to show that the conclusion is not caused by using "incorrect semivalues;" these wild changes hold for the Shapley value, the Banzhaf index, or any other choice. Thus, the problem is inherent in the structure of games and the semivalues.
To outline the simple proof of Thm. 6, let r k and λ k be, respectively, the ranking and semivalue assigned to the subset of k players; k = 2, . . . , n. The problem is to define a game where the λ k ranking of the k player subgame is r k . But this is easy because the two player outcome only involves assigning appropriate values to ν({1}), ν({2}), and ν({1, 2}). For three players, the added variables of ν({3}), ν({2, 3}), ν({1, 3}), ν({1, 2, 3}) can be used to create any desired ranking. However, to create the new ranking, we need to be assured that some of the extra variables can be used; this is the purpose of the λ j = 0 assumption. The same argument holds for all values of k.
This theorem tells us that consistency in rankings requires stronger assumptions about the game or semivalue. What causes difficulties in achieving "consistency" are the new variables used to compute the semivalues for larger games; these values -which indicate differing strengths of coalitions -can be selected to alter the semivalue ranking of subgames in any desired manner. Thus, assumptions introduced to achieve consistency must restrict the values of these new variables. Such consistency can reflect the game structure, e.g., the standard subgames of a monotone symmetric game are closely related. (This claim follows from Thm. 5 where the semivalues rankings are determined by coalition size. This assertion holds even if the subgames are not "standard," as long as they remain monotone symmetric.) Similarly, strictly additive games, where ν(S) = j∈S ν({j}), is another game structure imposing consistency on the semivalue rankings of the standard subgames.
To return to the general setting, among the several ways to restrict the ν values, one is for the semivalues to ignore contributions made to coalitions of certain sizes. To illustrate, a choice coming from sports requires λ j = 0 for j larger than some threshold value.
Definition 2.
A semivalue λ for games with n players is said to satisfy the threshold value T < n if λ j = 0 for all j ≥ T .
To view Thm. 6 from the perspective of linear algebra, recall that with more variables than equations, it is difficult to restrict the equation values. But when the number of equations exceeds the number of variables, relationships can exist. So, by considering the semivalues of all standard subgames (not just the nested set structure of Thm. 6), relationships may emerge. The next theorem both increases the number of equations and uses the threshold approach. Applying this result to sports, it implies that a top-ranked player cannot always be bottom ranked when some other player drop out. 
Concluding comments
It is surprisingly easy to create n-player games which exhibit differences in semivalue rankings. concerns. For instance, not only is manipulation, either wittingly or unwittingly, possible by choosing the semivalue, but even their meaning and applications seem to be in need of reexamination. The comments about changes in semivalue rankings when players leave poses a natural challenge to find games and associated semivalues which permit some compatibility in rankings when players drop out. We suspect that except for severely restricted games, the best relationships are of the Thm. 7 type where a player who is λ M top-ranked in all M -player games cannot be λ n bottom-ranked in the game with all n players.
Proofs
The proof of several of these results is based are rewriting the matrix of Eq. 3.1 in the following manner. Leave the P 1 column as specified. Next, define
ν(S).
In words, A j is the sum of characteristic values for coalitions of size j while A j,i is the sum over the coalitions which do not include player i. With this notation, the a i,j entry of matrix M n , 2 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, can be expressed as
The ith entry of the last column P n is ν(N ) − ν(N/{i}) = A n − A (n−1),i where N is the coalition of all players. Notice that the ith entry of P 2 can be expressed as [
Proof of Thm. 4. When the matrix multiplication of Eq. 3.1 is carried out with matrix entries expressed as above, the ith entry is of the form
The summation is common to all entries, so the ranking of the power index is determined by comparing the bracketed terms for different i values. Assuming λ 1 + λ 2 > 0 and defining m j = (λ j+2 + λ j+1 )/(λ 1 + λ 2 ), the rankings are completely determined by the values j , i = 1, 2 where the ith entry of A * j is A j,i and the ith entry of A is the sum of all other terms from Expression 6.3 which are common to both indices. Thus, the rankings defined by the two vector expressions depend upon the m i j distance A * j is moved from the common A. Since these distances differ and since the values of the two vectors are free to be designed by selecting appropriate characteristic values, the vectors can be positioned so the two expressions have any desired ranking. This is illustrated in Fig. 3 where A (the base of the two arrows) and one of the outcomes (given by the first arrowhead) have the 3 1 2 ranking, while the second outcome (given by the second arrowhead which extends in the same direction) has the reversed 2 1 3. (The comment following the statement of the theorem is proved in much the same manner. But here we need to ensure that the indices from different ranking classes are such that the version of Expression 6.3 has n − 2 independent directions.) According to the above computation of the number of times each term appears in the summation, it follows that if λ n satisfies Eq. 
